When the Supreme Court recast the judicial appointments system in 1993, it warned that keeping High Courts under acting Chief Justices for long periods “must be deprecated and avoided”. In the Second Judges case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993)), the Court connected orderly succession to the proper functioning of High Courts, treating delay as an institutional concern.
Two appointments completed on September 7, 2026, illustrate the significance of that concern. Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra took oath as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court despite the Punjab government’s demand for a pause. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal assumed office as Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, where Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma had served as acting Chief Justice for more than eleven months. During that period, Supreme Court judge Justice Sandeep Mehta had raised allegations about Sharma’s administration of the court.
The episodes bring three responsibilities into focus: allowing meaningful State consultation, preparing successors in time, and protecting the examination of complaints about judicial administration. A system that explains how it discharges these responsibilities offers a standard against which particular appointments, objections, and institutional responses can be assessed.
Article 217 requires the President to consult the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the Governor when appointing a High Court judge, including its Chief Justice. For a common High Court, Article 231(2)(a) extends the requirement to the Governors of all the States concerned. Both Punjab and Haryana therefore have a constitutional place in the process.
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The Supreme Court’s majority judgment in the Second Judges case identifies the Governor in Article 217 as acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Consultation therefore connects the appointment process to the elected State government. Judicial primacy gives the judiciary’s considered opinion decisive weight, while State participation allows relevant information and reasoned objections to be placed on record .
The Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) gives the CJI the role of initiating the appointment of a High Court Chief Justice. The CJI consults the two senior-most Supreme Court judges and also seeks the views of the senior-most colleague familiar with the High Court where the candidate has been serving. The recommendation and judicial views go to the Union Law Minister. Paragraph 6 of the MoP requires the Minister to obtain the State government’s views before submitting the proposal to the Prime Minister, who advises the President. The provisions on appointing a High Court Chief Justice, however, do not specify how much time within which the State government has to respond.
That sequence lay at the centre of the Punjab government’s objection. The Collegium recommended Justice Mishra’s elevation on August 6, 2026, and the Centre notified his appointment on September 5. The following day, the Punjab Cabinet contended that the Centre had proceeded before receiving the State government’s views. According to its statement, the consultation letter had arrived on August 12, leaving 24 days before notification.
Additional Solicitor-General Satya Pal Jain defended the appointment, maintaining that the Punjab government had sufficient time and could not obstruct the process indefinitely. He also said both Governors had approved the proposal and the Haryana government had supported it. The constitutional test must examine how each participant performed the assigned role. A Governor’s response needs to be considered alongside the ministerial advice on which it rests. Equally, a government claiming that its opportunity was curtailed should be able to show how it used the time available, including any request for information or an extension.
The Supreme Court addressed the delay in the Second Judges case. It envisaged six weeks for the other constitutional functionaries to convey their views after receiving a proposal. It also contemplated a memorandum implementing the framework, with modifications suggested by the CJI to give effect to its purpose.
Punjab Governor Gulab Chand Kataria (left) administering the oath of office to Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra on September 7, 2026.
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In PLR Projects v. Mahanadi Coalfields (2021), the Court recorded a six-week State response period, after which the Centre could presume that there was no objection. That case concerned the appointment of an ordinary High Court judge through the High Court Collegium. The appointment of a Chief Justice follows a separate route initiated by the CJI. The relationship between that route and the broader timing framework therefore requires careful examination.
In the Punjab government’s account, six weeks from the date it received the consultation letter would have extended beyond the September 5 notification. To assess whether the procedure followed was proper, the correspondence and the applicable time limit must be examined. The general principle is that proceeding on silence should depend on an identifiable deadline and an ascertainable basis for treating consultation as complete.
A consultation request should specify the applicable response period, the documents supplied, and the consequences of failing to respond. Any extension should have recorded reasons and a specified end date. An institution relying on urgency should explain the legal basis for a shorter timetable and show that the other participants had a meaningful opportunity to respond.
These safeguards protect a State government against having its opportunity curtailed through an unstated deadline and protect the appointment process against indefinite obstruction. They also place diligence at the centre of the State government’s role: a reasoned response must be prepared within the applicable period, and any additional time must be justified. The written record should show how any objection was considered and whether it prompted reconsideration. A disagreement over a candidate’s suitability calls for a reasoned assessment, whereas a failure to reply calls for application of a time limit. Keeping those steps separate helps prevent a substantive objection from being dismissed merely as delay.
Planning for regular leadership
A Department of Justice record dates Justice Sanjeev Prakash Sharma’s acting chief justiceship from September 28, 2025. The regular appointment was completed in September 2026, followed by a prolonged interim arrangement. Article 223 authorises another judge to perform the Chief Justice’s duties when the office is vacant, or its holder cannot act. It ensures continuity while leaving the duration of the arrangement open. The MoP’s succession provisions, however, envisage completing the appointment process at least a month before an anticipated vacancy. Its reference to acting arrangements ordinarily lasting no more than a month accompanies the requirement for simultaneous succession when an incumbent Chief Justice is transferred. Assessing a prolonged acting arrangement should therefore trace when selection began, which authority held the proposal at each stage and what impediments arose. Responsibility for the time taken belongs to the appointment chain and should be assessed separately from the acting Chief Justice’s performance.
In a resolution dated February 26, 2026, the Collegium acknowledged the value of preparation. It said a prospective Chief Justice could be transferred to the destination court in advance, preferably two months before the vacancy, to become familiar with its affairs. It expressly applied this approach to Justice Lisa Gill’s transfer from the Punjab and Haryana High Court to Andhra Pradesh in March and her subsequent elevation as its Chief Justice in April.
The appointment of Chief Justices in Punjab and Haryana and Rajasthan exposes gaps in the process of judicial succession and State consultation.
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The nominees’ different circumstances illustrate why the policy allows flexibility in arranging advance familiarisation. Justice Mishra was already serving in the Punjab and Haryana High Court when recommended for elevation, whereas Justice Agrawal’s transfer and elevation were recommended on August 31 against an existing vacancy. By recommending Justice Agrawal’s transfer and elevation together without providing for advance familiarisation, the Collegium failed to put its own February policy into practice and offered no explanation for departing from the standard it had set.
Protecting the examination of complaints
The allegations surrounding Justice Sharma’s tenure show why succession and complaint-handling require separate procedures. Justice Mehta wrote to CJI Surya Kant on August 2, 10, and 17, alleging manipulation of case listings, favouritism, and pressure on fellow judges. He sought Justice Sharma’s replacement as administrative head and the appointment of a regular Chief Justice.
In a fourth letter, dated August 30 and reported by The Indian Express on September 7, Justice Mehta alleged interference with a judicial committee’s inquiry into a judicial officer and breaches of confidentiality. In his public response, reported on September 3, Justice Sharma described the allegations as baseless and motivated by personal animosity. He said he had provided the CJI with an evidence-supported rebuttal. In an August 26 statement, the CJI emphasised the established institutional mechanism and the need to give those concerned a fair opportunity to respond. He also said that steps to fill the Chief Justice vacancies were under way. The Collegium’s August 31 resolutions recommending Justice Agrawal’s transfer and elevation recorded the appointment decisions without discussing the allegations.
The appointment of a court’s administrative head is one matter. But finding misconduct is another. It requires the examination of allegations, responses and evidence. The credibility of either a finding of misconduct or the rejection of a complaint depends on the fairness of that examination. Succession planning and protected fact-finding consequently serve different responsibilities, even when they concern the same court.
The Supreme Court supplied a relevant safeguard in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh (2014). It directed that a High Court judge facing allegations be deprived of administrative and supervisory control over witnesses. It also required reassignment of the local Chief Justice’s role in the initial examination because he had adopted a position on disputed facts. That case concerned a complaint against a High Court judge. The committee described in Justice Mehta’s fourth letter was examining a judicial officer, with interference alleged against the High Court’s administrative head. The institutional lesson here is that fact-finding should be protected from administrative power capable of influencing it, with safeguards tailored to the proceeding concerned.
Any decision on interim safeguards should consider access to records, authority over witnesses and the independence of those conducting the examination. The safeguards should be proportionate to the identified risk and subject to review. They protect the reliability of evidence and the position of a judge facing an unfounded accusation, as well as the complainant’s opportunity to be heard. Where a complaint concerns case allocation, an examination can compare published rosters and cause lists with registry orders authorising reassignment. Preserving that sequence allows investigators to establish who directed a change, when it occurred and what reason was recorded, while giving the concerned judge an opportunity to explain it.
Making the process visible
The appointment process would benefit from a public record of procedural steps: when a recommendation was made, when consultation requests were received, what deadlines applied, and when responses and decisions followed. Brief reasons for any departures from the usual timetable would allow scrutiny of the process while protecting confidential assessments of candidates. For prolonged vacancies, periodic review should identify the stage reached and the authority responsible for the next step. An unforeseen obstacle may justify additional time, but recording it allows the delay to be distinguished from a deliberate decision to carry out further examination. It also helps the participants coordinate their responsibilities before an interim arrangement becomes permanent.
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Complaint-handling requires comparable procedural accountability, with protection for privacy, witnesses, and a fair hearing. The CJI could provide limited information about the mechanism used, safeguards adopted, and completion of the examination. Any account of the outcome should explain its basis sufficiently to protect both institutional credibility and the reputations of those involved.
State governments must respond in time and give reasons for their views. The Union government must apply a defensible standard for completing consultation, and the CJI and Collegium must plan succession. The authority examining a complaint must, in turn, protect the integrity of that process throughout. These safeguards have value beyond individual appointments and controversies. A system that records why it waited, why it proceeded and how it protected independent examination makes the exercise of power open to scrutiny, whichever government or judge happens to hold office.
V. Venkatesan is a Contributing Editor at Supreme Court Observer. The views are his own.