India’s position in South Asia

I argue that India’s status in South Asia is under pressure from China’s large presence, the changing grand strategy of the United States (US), and Pakistan’s recent activism in West Asia.

Geopolitical

To what extent does India control its regional space in the face of the actions of China, the United States and Pakistan? The biggest concern here is China. Is India capable of containing China in South Asia in terms of limiting high-level mutual visits and arms sales to smaller South Asian countries (SSAC)?

From 2012 to 2026, the number of high-level visits to and from China was 90 and 35, respectively, for a total of 125 visits. Based on a parallel table (not shown here), the comparable figures for India are 111 and 62, for a total of 173 visits. India leads in total number of visits. SSACs behave “respectfully”: they travel to China and India more often than vice versa. However, senior Indian leaders attend SSAC more often than senior Chinese leaders.

China’s visits to and from South Asia show that the top three are Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka. For India, the top three are Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Thus, the status “battle” between China and India is most evident in Sri Lanka. Additionally, in 2024–26, top leaders of Bangladesh (Rahman) and Maldives (Muizzu) chose China for their first foreign visit, and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Amarasuriya visited China before visiting India. It is unclear whether China’s prioritization heralds any trend.

What about the US challenging India’s authority? America has supported India in South Asia since the early 2000s, hoping India will help check China’s power. By 2016, the deterrence partnership with India deepened in a free and open Indo-Pacific region. However, the US never left Pakistan despite Indian concerns. After September 11, 2001, Pakistan again became the forefront of American anti-terrorism policy. India viewed Pakistan as the main source of terrorism, but for the US, Pakistan was an ally in the fight against “global terrorism.”

Bangladesh has also become a contentious area. India maintained strong ties with Sheikh Hasina, while the US criticized her for human rights violations and electoral malpractices. Since her overthrow, the US has deepened ties with Bangladesh. US Ambassador to India Sergio Gore is also Special Envoy for South and Central Asia. As such, he is President Donald Trump’s traveling representative to the region, including Bangladesh. The US ignored India’s sensitivity on this issue.

It is clear that the US-India partnership in South Asia has stalled. US and Indian interests are not entirely aligned; and America may have concluded that India cannot stop China’s regional influence. Therefore, the United States must expand its role. The most revealing is US policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the Iran war, as well as deals with Islamabad over cryptocurrencies and critical minerals, have strengthened ties. Trump’s laudatory hospitality towards Field Marshal Asim Munir and the Indian administration’s frequent embarrassment over Operation Sindoor and Russian oil trade and purchases suggest that US ambivalence towards Pakistan has sharply weakened.

In addition to deepening ties with the US, Pakistan boasts a near-allied understanding with China and warm relations with Russia (including arms purchases). Pakistan’s shares rose thanks to shrewd diplomacy and new activism in West Asia. During Operation Sindoor, it was possible to create the impression that the fight with India had reached a dead end. This was followed by the signing of the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia in September 2025 and the Makkah Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkey in August 2026. In addition, Pakistan has renewed ties with the new government in Bangladesh. He also remains close to Sri Lanka, which he helped during its civil war, as well as the Muslim-majority Maldives.

Overall, China-US diplomacy in South Asia poses a challenge to India’s regional status. India has also failed to curb Pakistan’s growing assertiveness and strategic independence in the region or beyond.

Economic

Is India the economic leader in South Asia? India is the largest economy and has unmatched strengths – in manufacturing, agriculture, natural resources and services. The country is also “one of the world’s largest startup ecosystems,” according to the government.

What about India’s trade engagement with South Asia? With the exception of Pakistan, all of its neighbors in South Asia have strong economic relations with India. Since they all border India and none of them border each other, most of their regional trade is with India.

But in terms of trade partnerships, it is China, not India, that is leading. China is the largest trading partner of all South Asian countries except Nepal, and India is the second largest trading partner for the rest of the region (it is Nepal’s largest trading partner). It is worth noting that China is the leading trading partner of most countries in the world.

For major aid projects from China and India to SSAC, the picture appears balanced based on the number of projects included in the table (though a better indicator would be the dollar value of aid, but that is difficult to estimate). In general, China is building large new communications networks and infrastructure, while India is building more modestly and upgrading existing facilities. China is pursuing ports, highways, bridges, tunnels and energy projects, while India is focusing on existing infrastructure, excluding the construction of new hydroelectric and power plants. Given its deep pockets, China’s larger investment is understandable.

Our assessment of India’s position in South Asia is not the last word. Ideally, India’s regional status could be constructed by tracking the data presented here, as well as other indicators of status, over a longer period to discern trends more accurately. This preliminary analysis shows that India is holding its own for now, but the pressure on its regional status is significant. Raising India’s status in South Asia is not just about image building, as status affects internal security as well as external security and the country’s broader international role.

Dhriti Bhattacherjee, a research analyst at the Center for Social and Economic Progress, contributed to this column.